Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Evelin Lagos’ Blog Post: Unpacking the Trial & Appeals Process: Liebeck v. McDonald's

 


In 1992, 79-year-old Stella Liebeck ordered coffee at a McDonald’s drive-thru and, while parked, she placed the cup between her legs to remove the lid and add cream. The coffee spilled, causing severe third-degree burns across sixteen percent of her body that required hospitalization and skin grafts. When McDonald’s refused to cover her medical bills, she filed a lawsuit seeking damages.

The Trial Phase
During the trial, the court seated a jury selected from a jury venire after conducting voir dire. Liebeck served as a fact witness, testifying about the incident, while an expert witness in thermodynamics testified that McDonald's kept its coffee at dangerously high temperatures (180–190°F) compared to other restaurants. Defense counsel subjected the expert to cross-examination.

Following the judge's jury instructions on the civil standard of proof (requiring a preponderance of the evidence rather than the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard), the jury reached a verdict. They found McDonald’s liable and awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages (reduced due to her minor fault) and $2.7 million in punitive damages. Because the punitive award was excessive, the trial judge entered a judgment modifying it downward via remittitur. (Had an award been incorrectly low, the judge could have used an additur).

The Appellate Phase
Following the judge’s remittitur, both sides prepared to appeal. In civil procedure, a dissatisfied party acts as the appellant by filing a notice of appeal, while the opposing party acts as the respondent. McDonald’s sought to overturn the liability verdict, while Liebeck planned to cross-appeal to restore her full punitive award.

As an appeal as a matter of right, appellate judges would have reviewed the trial record for legal errors under standards like abuse of discretion, with the power to affirm the verdict or reverse and remand it back to the trial court. Any higher appeal would have required a discretionary writ of certiorari. However, before the appellate court heard the case, both parties reached a confidential out-of-court settlement to avoid prolonged litigation.

1. Discussion Question: The jury awarded Liebeck millions of dollars in punitive damages, but then the judge reduced this amount using remittitur in Liebeck. In your view, why do judges have post-trial tools like remittitur and additur? Where should courts draw the line between respecting a jury's verdict and correcting an "excessive" award?
2. Hypothetical Scenario:
Suppose that during trial, the judge erroneously excluded McDonald’s key safety evidence. McDonald's appeals as a matter of right. If the appellate court determines the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion, what action will the appellate court take regarding the judgment (reverse), and where does the case go next (remand)? 

Sources:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Liebeck_v_McDonalds_Restaurants_1994

Wednesday, October 7, 2026

Discovery Disaster: PDV USA, Inc. v. Interamerican Consulting Inc. By Kendra Hurst

 



Introduction

In May of 2020, PDV USA, Inc. v. Interamerican Consulting Inc., PDV brought a breach of contract complaint against Interamerican in the United States District Court, S.D. New York. for a failure to provide contracted services to their satisfaction. This case addresses the obligation to turn over evidence during discovery and the preservation of evidence.

Facts

After contracting Interamerican to provide explicit consulting services, PDV made initial payments of $15 million to Interamerican as agreed, before any contracted services were provided. After the receipt of initial reports PDV claimed Interamerican's failure to provide services, and did not pay the remaining $35 million due on July 15th, 2017 as required by the contract. They made known to Interamerican that the amount would be paid only if the agreed upon services were fulfilled.

In December of 2017 Interamerican sought legal advice in anticipation of litigation, which the court upholds as the point at which Interamerican should have reasonably inferred that they were under an obligation to preserve evidence. However, documentation obtained from Interamerican showed that they failed to implement a litigation hold until late 2018. 

During discovery, Interamerican failed to provide messages in the form of emails, WhatsApp messages, and other mobile messages to PDV, and PDV was only made aware of a large portion of existing communication when the documents were produced by the government and other third parties. At this point, PDV sought sanctions against Interamerican for their failure to preserve clearly relevant evidence.

The court found that Interamerican engaged in selective deletion of messages, encryption of messages that where known to be relevant to the case, that Interamerican gave shifting explanations as to why some messages where produced while others where not, gave contradictory testimony, and engaged in obfuscation and obstruction wherein Interamerican downplayed the significance of the missing documentation.

Ruling 

In January of 2026, the court ruled that Interamerican failed in their duty to preserve, spoliated relevant evidence, that PDV USA had been prejudiced, and that Interamerican acted in bad faith. The court found a failure to preserve evidence and awarded partial sanctions of an adverse inference instruction and attorney's fees in favor of PDV USA.

Response

Question: At what point does the obligation to preserve evidence arise?

Hypothetical: Suppose Interamerican had not sought legal advice in 2017 - would this have changed the courts finding of a failure of a duty to preserve?


Citations

(Note: you may need to already be logged in to Westlaw for the case link to take you directly to the case in question.) 

PDV USA, Inc. v. Interamerican Consulting Inc., No. 20-CV-3699 (JGK) (RWL), 2026 WL 203036 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2026) https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I310e18c0fbc211f093a3f9604e31fef9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0

Caitlin Oyler, ESI Spoliation Sanctions & Discovery Misconduct: Court Finds Intent to Deprive and Imposes Adverse Inference in PDV USA v. Interamerican, CODISCOVR (Feb. 12, 2026), https://codiscovr.com/esi-spoliation-sanctions-discovery-misconduct-court-finds-intent-to-deprive-and-imposes-adverse-inference-in-pdv-usa-v-interamerican/.

PDV USA, Inc. v. Interamerican Consulting Inc., No. 20-CV-3699 (JGK) (RWL), 2026 WL (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2026) (Lehrburger, M.J.), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2020cv03699/537042/297/.

Rule 37 Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions 

Rule 34 Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes 

 


Anatomy of a Civil Case: The Digital Evidence Problem By Meghan Corales

 



When most people think about discovery in a civil case, they probably imagine attorneys exchanging documents, taking depositions, and answering interrogatories. Today, however, an enormous amount of potentially relevant evidence exists electronically. Emails, text messages, social-media posts, photographs, cloud files, search histories, and even metadata can become important evidence. This creates a significant question during pretrial proceedings: When does a party have a duty to preserve electronically stored information?

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, parties must discuss discovery and preservation issues early in the litigation. The rule specifically recognizes the importance of addressing the preservation and production of electronically stored information when developing a discovery plan. This can be complicated because electronic information is constantly being created, modified, automatically deleted, or overwritten.

The duty to preserve becomes especially important when litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated. Rule 37(e) provides that if electronically stored information that should have been preserved is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, courts may impose measures to address the resulting prejudice. More serious sanctions, such as an adverse inference or dismissal, require a finding that the party intended to deprive the opposing party of the information.

This raises an interesting issue: How much information should a person or business realistically be expected to preserve? It would be unreasonable to require someone to permanently save every email, text, photograph, or computer file simply because a lawsuit might someday occur. The federal rules recognize this by focusing on taking “reasonable steps” rather than demanding perfection.

At the same time, allowing relevant evidence to disappear can undermine the fairness of the litigation process. For example, deleting potentially relevant text messages after learning that a lawsuit is likely could create serious problems, even if the deletion occurs through an ordinary phone setting.

Ultimately, electronically stored information demonstrates how technology has changed the discovery stage of civil litigation. Attorneys must think about preservation early, understand where their clients' information is stored, and make reasonable decisions about what needs to be protected. As digital evidence becomes even more central to civil cases, courts will continue to face the difficult balance between preserving evidence and preventing discovery from becoming unnecessarily expensive and burdensome.

Question: Where should courts draw the line between a reasonable duty to preserve electronic evidence and an unreasonable expectation that parties save everything?

Sources: